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PATENT LAW-PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS-DoES FEDERAL 
LAw PREEMPT STATE LAW? Aronson v. Qwck Pomt Pencil Co. 
440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1956 Jane Aronson gave QUIck Pomt Pencil Company an 
exclusIve license to make and sell keyholders that she had de­
sIgned. The license agreement provIded that Aronson receIve roy­
alties at the rate of 5 percent of gross revenues, to be reduced to 
21,2 percent if no patent Issued withm five years of the contract 
date. The agreement was to be bmding as long as QUIck Pomt con­
tmued to sell the keyholders. No patent was Issued and QUIck 
Pomt paId more than $200,000 m royalties from July 1957 through 
September 1975. In the late 1960's, competitors began makmg SIm­
ilar keyholders, havmg the advantage of not paymg royalties. Qmck 
Pomt's share of the market was subsequently reduced. 
In November 1975, Qmck Pomt asked for a declaratory Judg­
ment that it no longer had to pay royaltIes. 1 The distnct court 
treated the case as a contract case, governed by contract law It 
held for Aronson, notmg that the language of the contract was 
plaIn, clear, and uneqmvocal" and that QUIck Pomt had contmued 
to pay royalties long after the Patent Office had rejected the de­
fendant's patent. 2 
Qmck Pomt appealed, argumg that the distnct court erred m 
finding that the case was governed by contract law without regard 
for federal patent and antitrust consideratIons. 3 The Court of Ap­
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the distnct court's decIsIOn m 
Qwck Pomt Pencil Co. v. Aronson,4 ruling that the Issue mvolved 
the relatIonshlp between state contract law and federal patent law 
Charactenzmg Qmck Pomt as a patent application licensee, the 
court of appeals vIewed the Issue as whether Qmck Pomt was 
"bound by the contractual prOVISIon reqUIrmg it to pay royalties for 
as long as it manufactures the item described m the patent applica­
tion even though the licensor abandoned the application many 
1. 425 F Supp. 600, 601 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
2. ld. at 602. 
3. QUIck Pomt Pencil Co. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1977). 
4. 567 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1977), rev d, 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
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years ago and the licensee s competitors are freely manufacturmg 
the unpatented item."5 If a patent had Issued, the court reasoned, 
Qmck Pomt's liability would have termmated when the patent ex­
pIred after seventeen years. Also, Qmck Pomt could have chal­
lenged the patent's validity before then, possibly termmatmg liabil­
ity earlier 6 The court then concluded that the license agreement 
contravened the policy of the federal patent laws because the li­
censor whose patent applicahon was demed was gIven more pro­
techon than if a patent had been Issued. 7 The majority disputed the 
dissent's charactenzahon of the contract as a "trade-secret licensmg 
agreement," argumg that smce marketmg completely disclosed the 
keyholder, it could not be secret. 8 
The dissentmg Justice found the eXIstence of a patent applica­
tion Irrelevant,9 vIewmg the Issue as whether a contract extending 
payments beyond the duration of secrecy IS enforceable. The dis­
sent answered the majority s disagreement with its charactenzahon 
of the contract by notmg that the keyholder was secret at the time 
of disclosure and not copIed until long after it had been marketed. 
He saw the fact that marketing may lead to copymg as the reason 
that parties enter agreements requmng payments after disclosure 
has been made. 10 The dissent concluded that the contract did not 
conflict with any federal policy 
The United States Supreme Court granted Aronson s petition 
for certIorar1. 11 It agreed to decIde the extent to whICh the eXIS­
tence of a patent applicatIOn affects the Issue of federal preemption 
when a contract licensmg usage of an Idea IS m conflict with federal 
patent law If a patent had been Issued, Qmck Pomt could have 
challenged the validity of the patent. A successful challenge could 
have excused the duty to pay royalties under the contract. Since 
the patent was not Issued, Qmck Pomt was demed thIS opportu­
nity In light of these facts, it was necessary to resolve whether a 
contract that afforded Aronson benefits greater than she would have 
enjoyed if a patent had been granted VIOlated federal patent policy 
In a rather cursory opmIOn12 the Supreme Court unammously re­
versed the court of appeals, holding that the contract should be en­
5. Id. at 759, 760. 
6. Id. at 762. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 760 n.S. 
9. Id. at 762. 

lO. Id. at 763 n.4. 

11. 436 U.S. 943 (1978). 
12. 440 U.S. at 266. 
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forced because it did not conflict with federal patent policy 13 It 
dismIssed the possibility that Aronson mIght be recelvmg a greater 
YIeld without a patent as a matter of speculatIon. "14 In upholding 
the contract, the Court necessarily had to confront four preVIOUS 
Supreme Court cases mterpretmg federal patent policy and the ex­
tent to whICh that policy preempts state powers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The ConstitutIon grants Congress the power to promote the 
Progress of SCIence and useful Arts, by secunng for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclUSIve Right to theIr respective 
Writmgs and Dlscovenes. "15 A question anses as to whether con­
stitutional authority exercIsed by federal patent laws preempts 
vanous prOVlSlOns of state law protectmg "Authors and Inventors. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. IS and Compco Corp. v. 
Day Bnte Ltghttng, Inc. 17 were compamon cases m whIch the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that state unfau competition 
laws makmg it illegal to copy products whICh were not protected 
by a federal patent or a copynght were mconSlStent with the obJec­
tives of the federal patent laws. In ruling that state law was 
preempted, Justice Black, writmg for the Court, stated: "Just as a 
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly it can­
not, under some other law such as that forbIdding unfaIr competi­
tion, gIVe protection of a kmd that clashes with the objectives of 
the federal patent laws. "18 The breadth of thIS and other state­
ments m the Sears and Compco oplmons gave nse to preemption 
objections regarding other state laws, mcluding trade secret laws. 
Preemption objections prompted the Supreme Court, m Lear 
Inc. v. Adktns, 19 to overrule a preVIOUS declSlon m whICh the eXlst­
13. Id. at 263. 
14. Id. at 264. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § B, c1. B. 
16. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
lB. 376 U.S. at 231. Sears dealt with IllinOls unfau competition laws. Under 
those laws, Sears, Roebuck & Co. was en)omed from manufactunng lamps copied 
from an unpatented deSign by the StifIel Co. The court of appeals m essence held 
Sears liable for domg no more than copymg and marketing an unpatented article. 
Id. at 227. Justice Black deCISIOn was consistent with trade secret prmClples whICh 
allow no protection agamst copymg or reverse engmeermg. The broad language, 
however, raised an Issue of patent preemption of trade secret law Milgnm, Sears to 
Lear to Pamton: OfWhales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv 17 (1971). 
19. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Adkms, mechamcal engmeer employed by Lear Co. 
had developed and patented method of construction whICh produced gyroscope ac­
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ence of a licensmg agreement was deemed to estop a licensee from 
challengmg a patent. 20 ConsIstent with Sears the Court noted that 
federal law reqUIred that, unless covered by a valid patent, all 
Ideas m general cIrculatIOn be used for the benefit of the public. 21 
The Court declined, however, to follow the broad language of 
Sears and concluded that it should not attempt m any way to de­
termme what limitations, if any eXIst to prevent states from 
enforcmg contracts mvolvmg unpatented secret Ideas. 22 Once agam 
the preCIse contours of federal preemption of state protection of m­
ventIons was an open question. 
Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp.23 attempted to resolve the 
question of whether federal patent law preempts state trade secret 
protectIon. 24 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit. It held that an OhIO statute was not pre­
empted,25 and states may protect mtellectual property relatmg to 
mventIon. ChIef Justice Burger satd that the state was limited m 
regulatmg the area of patents and copynghts only to the extent that 
they did not conflict with the operation of laws m thIS area passed 
by Congress. 26 The Court analyzed possible conflict m terms of 
three categones of trade secrets: (1) A trade secret believed by its 
owner to constitute a validly patentable mventIon; (2) a trade secret 
curacy at low cost. In 17 page contract, Lear had promised to pay royalties for 
Adkms Improvements. The Supreme Court of California had ruled that the eXistence 
of thiS contract estopped Lear from challengIng the validity of the patent. 
20. [d. at 671 (overruling Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 
339 U.S. 827 (1950)). 
21. 395 U.S. at 668. 
22. [d. at 675. Justice Black objected In his concurrIng opmlOn to thiS omission 
as bemg In conflict with Sears and Compeo. "[P]nvate arrangements under whICh 
self-styled Inventors do not keep their discovenes secret, but rather disclose them, 
m return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws. 
Id. at 677. Justice White, however, In his concurrIng OpInIOn, pomted out that he 
found nothIng In the record and nothIng In thiS Court' opInIOn Indicating that Lear 
at any time contended In the state courts that once AdkIns patent was mvalidated, 
the royalty agreement was unenforceable as matter of federal law. [d. at 679. 
23. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). ApplYIng OhIO trade secret law, federal district court 
enJomed the disclosure or use of 20 claimed trade secrets by fonner employees of 
the company until the trade secret had been released or had become available to the 
public or had been obtamed by respondents from sources havmg the legal nght to 
convey the InformatIon. The IndiVidual respondents had Signed agreements not to 
disclose confidential Information or trade secrets. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed, finding conflict with federal patent laws. 
24. [d. at 472. 
25. 416 U.S. at 474 & n.4. The OhIO statute forbids the use of trade secret 
without the owner consent when that secret had been learned with the owner 
consent. OHIO REv CODE ANN. § 1333.51(c) (Page Supp. 1978). 
26. 416 U.S. at 479. 
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known to its owner not to be patentable; and (3) a trade secret 
whose valid patentability was In doubt. 27 In none of these three 
categones did the Court find conflict whICh would prevent the 
proper operatIon of the federal patent laws. The Court, however 
did not explicitly find that there was no conflict between federal 
patent law and trade secret licensmg agreements. 28 ConfuSIon on 
thIS Issue and its mteractIon with state contract law IS exemplified 
by the court of appeals declSlon m Qutek Pomt. The Supreme 
Court opmlOn, however, found enforcement of Qmck POInt's roy­
alty agreement with Aronson even less offensIve to federal patent 
poliCIes than state law protectmg trade secrets. "29 Thus, the validity 
of a royalty agreement for a penod longer than seventeen years re­
garding an unpatented item IS assured. The policy problems, how­
ever, still remam. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
Possible conflict between state trade secret protectIon or state 
contract law and the federal patent law necessarily must be dis­
cussed In terms of the poliCieS underlYIng the federal patent sys­
tem. VOlding a state law on the grounds of federal preemptIon 
Involves considermg whether that law mterferes with "the ac­
complishment and executIon of the full purposes and objectIves of 
Congress."30 The congresslOnal purpose of the patent laws IS to 
27. [d. at 484 (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 
1971». Because trade secret laws prOVide weaker protection than patent laws In that 
they do not forbid use of the secret when discovered Independently or through re­
verse engIneenng, the Court found that the possibility of an Inventor with patenta­
ble Invention relYing on trade secret law was remote. 416 U.S. at 490. Trade secret 
law produces benefiCial results to owners of only doubtfully patentable and clearly 
unpatentable Inventions. Little would be accomplished by abolishing trade secret 
protection for unpatentable Inventions. "The mere filing of applications doomed to 
be turned down by the Patent Office will bnng forth no new public knowledge or 
enlightenment. [d. at 485. Regarding Inventions with doubtful patentability, the 
Court found no conflict with patent law 
Eliminating trade secret law for the doubtfully patentable Invention IS 
likely to have deletenous effects on society and patent policy which we can­
not say are balanced out by the speculative gain which might result from the 
encouragement of some Inventors with doubtfully patentable Inventions 
which deserve patent protection to come forward and apply for patents. 
[d. at 489. 
28. The Kewanee Court did Implicitly endorse the enforcement of trade secret 
licenSing agreements by noting the economic waste that would result if thiS protec­
tion were abolished. [d. at 486-87 
29. 440 U.S. at 266. 
30. 416 U.S. at 479 (citing Hines v. Davldowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941»; see 440 
U.S. at 262. 
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promote mventIon, while at the same tIme preservmg free compe­
titIon. 31 
The patent system IS based on the qmd pro quo of the grant of 
exclusIVe nghts for a penod of years m return for public disclosure 
of the mventIOn. 32 A patent mcludes the exclusIve nghts to make, 
sell, and use, as well as the nght to license others to do so. These 
nghts are limited, however, by a term of years, and any royalty 
agreement by the patentee that goes beyond the expIratIon date of 
the patent IS unlawful per se. 33 ThIS IS consonant with the concern 
emphaSIzed m Sears and Compco that competitIon not be re­
stncted. 
Patents are often described as limited monopolies, and as 
such, militate agamst free competitIOn. In the case of a patent, 
however, a monopoly IS offered by the government for a limited 
penod m order to promote mventIon. Without thIS mcentIve, m­
ventors mIght not nsk the expense of both tIme and money m re­
search of new Ideas. Since the mventor always has the optIon of 
not revealing hIS mventIon, a limited monoply IS offered as protec­
tIon m consIderatIon for public disclosure. Sears and Compco ex­
pressed the Court's concern regarding state protectIon for 
unpatented Ideas, and Lear s pnmary concern was with the exten­
SIon of thIs kmd of limited monopoly protectIon to an mventIon 
whICh mIght not have been validly patented. 
Trade secret protectIon does not mterfere with the patent pol­
ICY of promotmg mventIon. It offers protectIon to Ideas that are not 
consIdered deservmg of patent protectIon,34 and may be consIdered 
a supplemental mcentIve to mventIon. The traditIonal concern re­
garding possible conflict with patent policy has been the preserva­
tIon of free competitIon by way of public disclosure of the Idea. 
Histoncally it was antICIpated that few mventors would decline the 
temporary monopoly afforded by a patent because the trade secret 
route contamed nsks m terms of preservatIon of the secret. 35 Since 
patents are costly to obtam and patent suits are notonously expen­
SIve to defend,36 the concern today IS that many compames are 
31. 376 u.s. at 230-31. 
32. P ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FuNDAMENTALS 7 (1975). 
33. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
34. The CommiSSIOner of the Patent Office makes this determmation mitially 
based on novelty usefulness and nonobvlOusness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 131 
(1976). 
35. Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF SOC'y 638 
(1970). 
36. Milgnm, supra note IB, at 28 n.48, 32 n.63. Although research has not dis­
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chOOSIng to use trade secrets, thereby aVOIding the disclosure ne­
cessitated by the patent system. The fear IS that the alms of the 
patent system are beIng cIrcumvented. 37 
In awarding a limited monopoly to an Inventor as consIdera­
tIon for disclosure of hIS InventIon to the public, the patent system 
benefits both the Inventor and the public. Trade secret laws, on 
the other hand, offer less protectIon to an Inventor, but do not re­
qmre disclosure. If the product cannot be easily discovered Inde­
pendently or through reverse engIneenng, an Inventor can possess 
a monopoly for longer than the statutory seventeen years, poten­
tIally reapmg rewards greater than those afforded by the patent 
system. Thus, the Inventor prospers without the public benefitmg. 
Disagreement, however, eXIsts regarding the nature of the alms 
of federal patent policy In hIS concurnng OpInIOn In Kewanee 38 
JustIce Marshall noted that trade secret protectIon was sometImes 
more attractIve to Inventors than the patent system, but he did 
not find that dispositIve. He saw the Issue as whether Congress 
enacted the patent laws merely to offer Inventors a limited mo­
nopoly m exchange for disclosure of theIr mventIon, or Instead to 
exert pressure on Inventors to enter mto thIs exchange by with­
drawmg any alternatIve possibility of legal protectIon for theIr m­
ventIons. "39 He deCIded that the former was the case. 40 JustIce 
Douglas, m hIS dissent, vehemently disagreed. He mterpreted 
Sears and Compco as standing for the propositIon that "every artI­
cle not covered by a valid patent IS m the public domaln. "41 
The United States Supreme Court m Goldstem v. Califorma42 
took a mIddle ground, contending that the constitutIonal mandate 
to "promote" mventIon meant to "stImulate, to "encourage," or to 
"induce."43 Thus, there 1S disagreement whether federal patent 
policy precludes the eX1stence of an alternatIve system. Qutck Pomt 
does not expressly confront th1s, but by ImplicatIon it would appear 
that Ch1ef JustIce Burger, writmg for the Court, would agree with 
closed any statistics on the frequency of litigation connected with patents as opposed 
to trade secrets, Lear and the monetary Incentive for patent licensee to litigate 
would suggest that there would be more frequent litigation for the possessor of 
patent. 395 U.S. at 653. 
37. Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 674-75. 
38. 416 U.S. at 493. 
39. ld. at 494. 
40. ld. 
41. ld. at 495. Justice Douglas futher expressed hiS belief that the Constitution 
expresses an activist policy. ld. at 499 {citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8}. 
42. 412 U.S. 546 {1972}. 
43. ld. at 555. 
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JustIce Marshall, that the purpose of the patent laws was merely an 
offer by Congress of a limited monopoly He sees the Aronson 
agreement as consonant with federal patent policy finding nothmg 
wrong with an additIonal mcentIve to mventIon"44 outsIde of the 
patent system. 
Trade secret law on the other hand, grew out of a deSIre to 
perpetuate ethICal dealing m a busmess context. 45 It IS based on a 
varIety of theorIes, mcluding breach of contract, breach of confi­
dence, VIOlatIon of fiducIary obligatIons, mIsapprOprIatIon, unfaIr 
competitIon, and mfrIngement of property rIghts. 46 Like patent 
policy trade secret law IS concerned with prOVIding mcentIves to 
mventors. 47 "[T]he first prmciple of trade secret law IS the 'inher 
ent rIght' of an mnovator to try to keep hIS mnovatIon secret, 
whereas one of the poliCIes of the patent system IS to promote dis­
closure. "48 Trade secret law however does not necessarily discour 
age disclosure. The dissent m Qutck Pomt at the court of appeals 
level VIewed trade secret protectIon m licensmg agreements as en­
couragmg disclosure to a manufacturer Although thIs prIvate dis­
closure does not necessarily foster competitIon, it does promote 
utilizatIon of the mventIon. 49 There IS no dismcentIve to patent, 
according to the dissent, because the greater value of a patent li­
cense whICh protects agamst copymg would be taken mto conSIder­
atIon m the bargaInmg process. ThIS premmm was reflected m the 
hIgher royaltIes for the patent perIod m the QUIck Pomt contract. 50 
Like patent protectIon, then, trade secret protectIon encourages m­
ventIon, offermg protectIOn to mventIons of a lesser degree of mno­
vatIon. 51 
The Issue m QUlck Pomt was whether a licensmg agreement 
for an unpatented mventIon may mvolve royalty agreements for a 
44. 440 U.S. at 262. 
45. See Doerfer, The LImits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent 
and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV L. REv 1432, 1432, 1451 (1967); Johnson, Reme­
dies In Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw U.L. REv 1004, 1028 (1978); Orenbuch, su­
pra note 35, at 638. 
46. Comment, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions 
Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV L. REV 807 826 (1974). 
47. 416 U.S. at 481. 
48. Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1441. 
49. 567 F.2d at 765; Milgnm, supra note 18, at 18 n.5. 
50. 567 F.2d, at 766. 
51. 416 U.S. at 493. It must be noted that although parallel to patent protection 
and without statutory time limit, thiS protection IS more limited. There IS no pro­
tection agaInst Independent development by thIrd parties. Once an Invention IS pub­
lic, anyone IS free to copy or reverse engIneer the discovery. 
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longer penod of tIme than would be allowable under federal patent 
law 52 AnalYSIS of pnor cases clearly Indicated that the court of ap­
peals deCISIon warranted reversal. Although cited by the majority 
In the court of appeals, Lear was pnmarily concerned with the 
public policy of encouragIng challenges to patents. Since a patent 
licensee who paId the royaltIes had the most economIC IncentIve to 
challenge a patent, the doctrIne of licensee estoppel prohibitIng 
such challenges VIOlated that public policy Since no patent Issued 
In QUIck POInt, the policy conSIderatIons of Lear are not applica­
ble. 53 The Supreme Court noted thIS, uneqUIvocably statmg: 
"[N]either the holding nor the ratIonale of Lear controls when no 
patent has Issued. "54 
The fears expressed In Sears that competitIon would be lim­
ited are also unwarranted under the QUIck POInt facts. Sears and 
Compco were concerned with unfaIr competitIon and the freedom 
of competitors to copy 55 The deSIgn m Sears beIng protected by 
IllinOIS law had already been disclosed to the public by distributIon 
and IllinOIS was constraInIng all possible competitors. 56 In QUIck 
POInt, the licensmg agreement bound no one except the licensee. 
Competitors of QUIck Pomt were copymg the keyholder QUIck 
Pomt was obliged to pay royaltIes, but also had the optIon to cease 
manufacturmg the keyholder 57 
52. See text accompanying notes 53-62 mfra. 
53. The Court m Lear weighed the competing considerations of contract law 
and federal patent law. 
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids purchaser to repudiate hiS 
promises Simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargam he 
has made. On the other hand, federal law reqUIres that all Ideas m general 
Circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by 
valid patent. 
395 U.S. at 668. 
54. 440 U.S. at 264. 
55. 376 U.S. at 231-32. 
56. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 263 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Johnson, supra note 45, at 1006. The Court In Sears was really consldenng Stiffel' 
activities as VIOlation of federal antitrust policy rather than federal patent policy 
and would be better understood In those terms. Doerfer, supra note 45 at 1457, 1461. 
The public does not have nght to unpatented mformation that has not been al­
ready disclosed. Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption In LIght of Goldstein 
and Kewanee (Part II), 56 J. PAT. OFF SOC'Y 4, 20-21 (1974). 
57 It IS Important to distinguish between contracts In whICh parties Intend 
the obligation to be perpetual from those In whICh there IS no fixed date of termma­
tion, but where termination IS conditioned on an event. See Warner-Lambert Phar­
maceutical Co. v. Reynolds, 178 F Supp. 655, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afi'd, 280 
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960). After more than 75 years of paymg royalties on the formula 
for Llsterme, Warner-Lambert sought release from the contract. The court upheld the 
120 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:111 
The most recent Supreme Court declSlon m thIs line, Ke­
wanee held that m a trade secret misappropnatIon case, state 
trade secret law was not preempted by federal patent law 58 The 
Qutck Pomt dissent m the court of appeals opmed that by Implica­
tion, Kewanee also approved enforcement of trade secret licensmg 
agreements, thereby limitmg the potentially broad Implications of 
Lear 59 ThIS mterpretatIon of Kewanee IS buttressed by the 
Califorma declSlon m Stnclatr v. AquarIus ElectronIcs. 6o The court 
m Sinclatr found that the policy pnncipies consIdered decIsIve m 
Kewanee are applicable with equal, if not greater, force to a pn­
vate contract where the licensee voluntarily assumes that m return 
for gammg posseSSIon of a trade secret he IS gomg to pay the 
agreed consIderation to the mventor "61 Other cases with congru­
ent fact patterns would uphold the Qmck Pomt contract. 62 Thus, 
the Supreme Court's declSlon m Qutck Pomt to reverse was well 
grounded. 
The consequences of affirmmg the court of appeals declSlon 
and disallowmg trade secret licensmg agreements m order to fur­
ther patent law policy would have been detnmental to the dissemI­
nation of new Ideas. Since the court of appeals concern seemed to 
be that royalties under the contract for an unpatented Idea had to 
be paid for a longer penod than allowable under the patent laws, 
the mam thrust of affirmmg the court of appeals declSlon would 
have been to prohibit licensmg agreements with royalty payments 
for more than seventeen years. Presumably thIS would not have 
been restncted to situations where patents had been applied for 
and demed, because potential licensees would have cIrcumvented 
thIS limitation by SImply not applymg for a patent. If payments had 
been restncted to seventeen years, mventors mIght have preferred 
to sell theIr Ideas for a lump sum payment whICh would not have 
been prohibited by a declSlon affirmmg the court of appeals. 63 Per­
centage royalty payments are usually agreed on because of the dif­
contract, ruling that the obligation to pay continued until the company ceased to 
manufacture or sell Llstenne. 178 F Supp. at 660. 
58. 416 U.S. at 493. 
59. 567 F.2d at 765. 
60. 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974) (enforced royalty agreement 
obligating AquarIUS to pay royalties on Sinclair unpatented deVICe whICh converted 
brain waves mto an audible form). 
61. Id. at 225, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 666. 
62. Pamton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971) (involvmg the 
licensmg of deSigns for electromc components); Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. 
v. Reynolds, 178 F Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a/i'd, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960). 
63. 84 HARv L. REV 477,482-83 (1970). 
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ficulty In valuIng prospectively a new Idea. 64 If the lump sum sales 
of Ideas were substituted for licenSIng agreements, they would be 
premIsed on hIghly speculative pnces whICh manufacturers mIght 
not be willing to pay Thus, the effect would have been to reduce 
the number of new Ideas exposed to the public. ThIs mIght have 
Increased disclosure for clearly patentable Inventions but would 
have decreased dissemInation of unpatentable Ideas and Ideas of 
doubtful patentability 65 ThIS result loses the advantages of maIn­
taInIng a supplementary system of protection. The pnme disadvan­
tage of elimInatIng long term licenSIng of trade secrets would have 
fallen upon Inventors who do not have the financIal capability of 
manufacturIng theIr own Inventions. Ideas belongmg to large 
compames could still have been utilized without the disclosure re­
qmred by patent law 66 
IV POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS NOT CONSIDERED 

BY THE SUPREME COURT 

The Supreme Court unammously reversed the court of ap­
peals, denymg any conflict between enforcement of the Qmck 
Pomt contract and federal patent policy The Court found enforce­
ment of the agreement even less m conflict with the patent system 
than state trade secret law and saId: 
The most commonly accepted definitIon of trade secrets IS re­
stricted to confidentIal mformation whICh IS not disclosed m the 
normal process of exploitation Accordingly the exploita­
tIon of trade secrets under state law may not satIsfy the federal 
policy m favor of disclosure, whereas disclosure IS mescapable m 
exploitmg a deVIce like the Aronson keyholder. 67 
The Court's declSlon to enforce the contract was a relatively 
easy one because Aronson s Invention was completely revealed 
upon exammatIon of the keyholder The Court's opmlOn stated: 
The deVIce whICh IS the subject of thIS contract ceased to 
have any secrecy as soon as it was first marketed, yet when the 
contract was negotIated the mventIveness and novelty were suffi­
CIently apparent to mduce an experienced novelty manufacturer 
to agree to pay for the opportunity to be first m the market. 
Federal patent law IS not a barrier to such a contract. 68 
64. ld. at 482. 
65. 416 U.S. at 486; Pamton & Co. v. Bourns Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 
1971); 84 HARV L. REv 477 482 (1970). 
66. 416 U.S. at 486. 
67. 440 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). 
68. ld. 
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A vOId, therefore, eXIsts m the Court's opmIOn. The question 
remams whether a sImilar contract regarding an Idea not totally 
disclosed upon mspectIon of the item would be enforceable. En­
forcement of the QUick Pomt contract furthers the federal policy of 
disclosure of mventIons, but thIS would be true primarily for items 
whICh could be easily reverse engmeered. The Court did not deal 
with thIs problem. In a rather cursory deCISIon, the Court reversed 
the court of appeals, Ignormg situations not covered by the facts of 
thIS case, such as where mventIons cannot be easily reverse engI­
neered. It need not have done so. 
The Court could have affirmed or reversed the court of ap­
peals declSlon, abolishmg state protection for trade secret licensmg 
agreements, upholding such protection (perhaps while requestmg 
explicit gUidelines from Congress), or modifymg the amount of pro­
tection allowed through partial preemptIOn. The Court mIght have 
followed the course of its deCISIon m Gold,stetn. 69 In dealing with 
state copYright laws m Goldstetn, the Court upheld state protec­
tion, emphasIzmg the need to distmgUIsh situations of possible con­
flict between federal and state laws from those m whICh conflicts 
would necessarily arIse. 70 It found it difficult to see how concurrent 
powers of Congress and the states m the cOPYright area would 
necessarily and mevitably lead to conflicts.71 By analogy one 
mIght argue that state trade secret and contract laws also should 
not be preempted. 72 Here, too, there IS no mevitable conflict. Per 
haps thIS IS not a matter for JudiCIal declSlon but an Issue for con­
gressIOnal action. In the new federal copYright law for example, 
state laws are explicitly preempted or explicitly left mtact.73 The 
Goldstetn Court made it plam that the Constitution did not itself 
deny state protection of copynghts. 74 As with copynghts, m the ab­
sence of congressIOnal action regarding trade secrets, one may ar 
gue that state law may be left mtact. 75 Furthermore, the long con­
69. 412 U.S. 546. Goldstem was convicted under California statute forbidding 
the puating of recordings produced by others. He moved to dismiSS the complamt 
claiming that the California law was m conflict with federal copynght laws. ld. at 
548. 
70. Id. at 554. 
71. ld. at 559. Further, the Court mterpreted the language of the Constitution 
proViding for copynghts "for limited Times as limitation on Congress and stated 
that state statute cannot be VOided because of the mdefinite duration of its protec­
tion. ld. at 560-61 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8). 
72. The Kewanee Court makes thiS analogy. 416 U.S. at 478-79. 
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). 
74. 412 U.S. at 553, 560. 
75. See Wydick, supra note 56, at 10; Comment, Goldstem v. California: Break­
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gressIOnal silence regarding trade secrets mIght be deemed 
eVIdence of a lack of preemptIve mtent. Indeed, some federal stat­
utes Implicitly recogmze trade secret law 76 
Trade secret protectIon offers an alternatIve system to the 
patent system. Advantages over the patent system, such as lower 
costs, mdefinite duratIon, and lack of the need to meet an obJec­
tIve standard of novelty are balanced by nsks that do not eXIst m 
the patent system, such as nonexclusIvity of nghts after mdepend­
ent discovery or reverse engmeermg. 77 The Kewanee Court found 
that another form of mcentIve to mventIon was not mconsIstent 
with patent policy 78 Indeed, trade secret laws supplement the 
patent system by allowmg protectIon for mventIons whICh fall be­
low the standards reqUIred by the patent laws. 79 
The Court mIght have preempted state protectIon for patent­
able Ideas. Trade secret protectIon mIght have been reserved for 
those mventIons clearly not patentable m order to create additIonal 
mcentIves to obtam patents. 80 ThIS would have led, however, to 
problems m determmmg whICh mventIons are patentable81 or, 
usmg a lesser standard, what a reasonable mventor would consIder 
clearly patentable. 82 Pressure would thus be exerted for mventors 
to obtam patents for Ideas of dubIOUS patentability PotentIal licen­
sees would find it profitable to assert the patentability of mventIons 
to negate trade secret protectIon and then challenge the patent 
after Issuance, thereby relievmg the mventor of patent protectIon. 
Indeed the Lear decIsIon exacerbated one of the problems of the 
patent system by encouragmg challenges to patents. 83 Perhaps thIS 
mg up Federal Copynght Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV 960, 964 (1974). More ng­
orous standards reqmred for patents may diminIsh the value of USing copyright de­
velopments by analogy to patent law. Id. at 973. 
76. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c){4)(1976) (government agencies must conduct pub­
lic meetings except for those portions of meeting whICh are likely to disclose trade 
secrets); Id. § 1905 (sanctions Imposed on federal officers or employees who disclose 
trade secrets learned In the course of office or employment). See also Milgnm, 
supra note 18, at 32; Wydick, supra note 56, at 14. 
77 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 15; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment 
(a) (1939). 
78. 416 U.S. at 483-84. 
79. Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1456; Milgnm, supra note 18, at 34; Orenbuch, 
supra note 35, at 664-65; Wydick, supra note 56, at 27-28. 
80. 416 U.S. at 492; Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 665; Stern, A Reexammation 
of State Trade Secret Law after Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv 927, 931 (1974); 
see Comment, supra note 46, at 807. 
81. See Comment, supra note 46, at 807 
82. Stern, supra note 80, at 986. 
83. Although challenge may be unsuccessful, the expense of defending such 
suit could be rumous for patentee. 
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problem could be allevIated by legIslation convertmg patent li­
censes to trade secret licenses m the event of a patent bemg suc­
cessfully challenged. 
Another alternative would have been preemption m terms of 
remedy only m order to comply with federal patent policIes. The 
Court could have allowed trade secret protection but disallowed 
any nghts m excess of those allowed by federal patent law In 
terms of trade secret licensmg agreements, thIs would mean limit­
mg royalties to a seventeen-year penod,84 and mandating disclo­
sure after thIs tIme. 85 In cases of trade secret misappropnatIon 
or breach of contract actions between employer and employee, the 
Court could have restncted remedies to money damages and disal­
lowed permanent mJunctIons. 86 ThIS limitation would meet the ob­
Jections expressed by Justice Douglas m hIS Kewanee dissent. 87 
ThIS mIght be more conSIstent with the federal patent policy fa­
vonng disclosure while permittmg the mnovatIon also fostered by 
trade secret protection. 
Since the Court found no need for preemption at all, it mIght 
have suggested congressIonal action to federalize trade secret pro­
tection by Implementmg a two-tiered federal system whICh would 
offer lesser advantages for mventIons whICh do not meet the stnct 
standards now reqUIred by the patent system. 
V CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has deCIded that a contract requmng roy­
alties for longer than seventeen years for a deVIce completely dis­
closed on exposure and for whICh a patent was demed, does not 
conflict with federal patent policy Although clearly mandated by 
pnor cases, thIs deCISIon IS troublesome m terms of both its POSSI­
ble application to agreements on deVIces whICh are not readily re­
vealed and possible dismcentIves for mventors to enter the patent 
system. Since patent nghts eXIst for only seventeen years, a con­
tract whICh calls for royalties over a longer penod may grant advan­
tages greater than those that can be legally obtamed through the 
federal patent system. Perhaps the emphaSIS should be on the 
Goldstem Court's concept of actively encouragmg mventors to en­
84. See Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1148. An amicus cunae bnef III Qu.ck Pomt 
suggests limiting royalties, not by duration, but by court determmed head start 
value. Bnef for Ercon, Inc., as AmiCUS Cunae at 8. 
85. Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 676-77 
86. Johnson, supra note 45, at lO27; Stem, supra note SO, at 931. 

87 416 U.S. at 496,499. 
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ter the patent system rather than Justice Marshall's VIew of offermg 
a passIve alternative. Although the Court states that enforcement 
of thIS agreement does not discourage anyone from seektng a 
patent,"88 thIS conclusIon IS questionable. In VIew of the seventeen 
year limitation Imposed on royalties and the encouragement gIven, 
by Lear to patent challenges, it IS not clear that an mventor whose 
Idea IS not as easily revealed as Aronson s would nsk the disclosure 
mvolved m a patent application rather than rely on pnvate 
licensmg agreements. In such a case, the federal policy desmng 
disclosure of new Ideas would be frustrated. 
The Supreme Court declSlon IS disappomtmg m its failure to 
explicate the policIes surrounding thIS declSlon. The Court cited 
Kewanee regarding its concern to encourage mventIon m areas 
where patent law does not reach. "89 It would have been prefer­
able to expand on thIS concern by encouragmg Congress to reVIse 
patent law to reach these areas. 
Manan Solomon Lubmsky 
88. 440 U.S. at 263. 
89. ld. at 266 (quoting, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 485). 
